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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to provide with an updated snapshot of the water and sanitation sector 
across Latin American countries, focusing of its key policy characteristics. Access to water and 
sanitation in the region has improved since the 1990s, decade during which almost every country 
adopted major reforms of the sector, consisting mainly in increasing private sector participation and 
the creation of autonomous regulatory bodies. We find that challenges remain in tariff design, service 
quality, financial health of the sector, and in governance issues related to a lack of coordination 
between the level of decentralization of the regulation and management of the sector. Finally, the 
paper provides with a review of the related empirical literature. 
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  1 
Introduction* 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) is endowed with abundant fresh water: In 2014, it accounted for 
32 percent of the world’s internal renewable water resources (FAO 2016). Historically, however, 
access to improved water and sanitation services in the region was unequal, service quality was poor, 
and financing of the sector was inadequate.  
To deal with such issues, starting in the early 1990s, countries adopted major reforms of their water 
and sanitation sectors. By the end of the decade, almost every country in the region had undertaken 
such sector reforms (Foster 2005). The objectives of these reforms were to extend access to water and 
sanitation services to 100 percent of the population and improve the efficiency and financial viability 
of the sector.  
To achieve these objectives, most LAC countries introduced legislation focused on financing and 
governance. Efforts were made to attract private participation to the sector, in order to fill the 
financing gap. Initial aggressive efforts in some countries led to very high levels of private 
participation by the end of the 1990s (86 percent of total financing of the sector in Chile and 62 
percent in Argentina). By the mid-2000s, however, private participation had returned to its earlier 
(low) levels (Foster 2005). 
Many countries also created autonomous regulatory bodies to supervise the activities of the private 
sector, in order to ensure that quality standards were met in a cost-effective manner. These reforms 
went farther than the private sector participation reforms: By the end of the 1990s, more than half of 
the countries in the region had created a regulatory body in the sector (see appendix table A.1 for a list 
of the regulators in each country). Incongruences between the level of government at which the sector 
was regulated (centrally) and managed (more locally) limited the positive impact of such reforms, 
however. 
Thus, following the reforms that started during the early 1990s throughout LAC countries, progress 
in access to water and sanitation services was made, but there is evidence that such progress has been 
significantly constrained by affordability and governance issues. This chapter describes the key 
characteristics of the sector in LAC. The next section looks at sector performance (access to water and 
sanitation and tariffs in the water sector). The following sections describe governance (regulation and 
the role of private participation), briefly review the empirical literature, and summarize the chapter’s 
main findings.  
Sector Performance  
Access to Improved Water Sources 
Access to improved drinking water sources has increased since the beginning of the reform waves that 
started in the early 1990s. For the region as a whole, access increased from 81 percent of the 
population in 1990 to 95 percent in 2015 (figure 1). All but two countries (the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti) increased access during this period. Belize, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay, 
which had very low access rates in 1990, increased access to more than 95 percent. 
  
                                                     
*
 We are grateful to Antonio Estache for comments and suggestions. Any mistake or misinterpretation is our responsibility 
and ours only and should not be attributed to any of the institutions we are affiliated with. 
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Figure 1 Access to improved drinking water sources, by country, 1990 and 2015 
 
Source: World Health Organization (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017). 
Progress in LAC was remarkable by world standards. So great was the improvement that in 2015, the 
only set of countries that had a higher access rate than LAC were developed countries, where 99 
percent of the population had access to improved drinking water (figure 2).  
Figure 2 Access to improved drinking water sources in rural and urban areas, by world region, 
2015 
 
Source: World Health Organization (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017).  
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Figure 3 Access to improved drinking water sources in urban and rural areas, by country, 1990 
and 2015 
 
Source: Joint Monitoring Programme of the World Health Organization and UNICEF (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017). 
Improvement was fueled by increases in urban access. Rural access remains low: The region performs 
better than Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and Central Asia and better than the average for 
developing countries (84 percent versus 83 percent), but it lags well behind developed countries, 
where 98 percent of the rural population has access (figure 2). In some countries, such as Argentina, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay, rural rates are close to urban ones. In others, such as Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela, rural access rates are below 80 percent, considerably below 
urban rates (figure 3). Efforts to improve access have focused on urban areas, possibly because of their 
high growth rates in terms of population and increasing demand for water services.
1
  
Access to Improved Sanitation Services  
Access to sanitation improved in LAC between 1990 and 2015, but the average figure reached just 81 
percent (figure 4). Some countries made good progress: Between 1990 and 2015, access increased 
from 28 percent to 50 percent in Bolivia, from 48 percent to 83 in Honduras, and from 57 percent to 
85 percent in Ecuador. However, and though important improvements, some countries were in 2015 at 
worryingly low levels, such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti or Nicaragua. 
  
                                                     
1
 LAC is the most urbanized region in the world, having increased its urbanization rate from 73 percent in 1995 to 80 
percent in 2014 (Arroyo, Ballestero, and Mejía 2015). 
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Figure 4 Access to improved sanitation, by country, 1990 and 2015 
 
Source: Joint Monitoring Programme of the World Health Organization and UNICEF (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017).  
Access to improved sanitation services exceeded 90 percent in urban areas of most countries in the 
region in 2015 (figure 5). It was much lower in rural areas: In some countries (Guatemala, Bolivia, and 
Haiti), less than half the rural population had access to improved sanitation. 
Figure 5 Access to improved sanitation services in urban and rural areas, by country, 2015 
 
Source: Joint Monitoring Programme of the World Health Organization and UNICEF (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017).  
Overall, access to sanitation services is lagging and there are important inequalities in terms of rural 
versus urban access. It is worth highlighting, however, that though efforts are still needed and that 
there is a clear urban bias, there have been significant improvements, driven by essentially by Bolivia 
(28 percent in 1990 and 50 percent in 2015), Honduras (48 percent in 1990 and 83 percent in 2015), or 
Ecuador (57 percent in 1990 and 85 percent in 2015).  
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Water Tariffs 
Water tariffs play a key role in improving the efficiency of water use. On the demand size, they 
determine the price water users pay for water, thus having social equity consequences. On the supply 
side, they determine the extent to which water utilities can recover costs, thus having financial 
sustainability consequences. 
Increasing block tariffs (IBTs) have traditionally been the choice of water regulators and 
policymakers in developing countries, because they supposedly protect the poor. In such an IBT set-
up, consumption is structured in blocks, with the first block corresponding to the lowest level of 
consumption and the last block corresponding to the highest level of consumption. Water users are 
charged a fixed unit price for the units consumed in the first block, a higher price for units consumed 
in the second block, and so on. In terms of policy, three decisions must be taken when setting up an 
IBT structure: (i) the number of blocks, (ii) the volume of water associated with each block, and (iii) 
the unit price of water associated to each block. 
Increasing block tariffs were long thought to be efficient, pro-poor, thus attending to equity 
concerns, and environmentally advantageous for the following reasons:  
 Wealthier households and industrial firms cross-subsidize poor households, promoting equity.  
 Higher prices associated with higher blocks of consumption discourage irresponsible water use, 
supporting environmental objectives.  
 Block charges are consistent with marginal cost pricing, which promotes economic efficiency.  
But doubts have been raised about their effectiveness in developing countries. Boland and Whittington 
(1998) conclude that they increase inefficiency, inequity, complexity, opacity, and instability and 
create forecasting difficulties. They claim that simpler structures—such as two-part tariffs, which 
charge a fixed price per month plus a variable amount based on the volume consumed—can achieve 
better results.   
Increasing block tariffs are the most common water tariff structure in LAC. Capitals
2
 in all 
countries except Chile, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, which have two-part water tariffs, and 
Haiti, which has a simple linear tariff, use increasing block tariffs (figure 6).
3
 However, the design of 
IBT structures vary significantly across countries in terms of level of fixed and variable charges, and 
number and width of blocks. 
  
                                                     
2
 For some countries, due to unavailability of data on its capital cities, the analysis has been done on the most important 
city, in economic and population terms. 
3
 The Bahamas has not been included in the figures due to their considerably higher tariffs with respect to the rest of the 
region, creating graphical distortions.  
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Figure 6 Water tariffs in selected capitals, 2016  
 
Sources: Data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET) and Global Water 
Intelligence (2016).  
These differences in the level of fixed and variable charges, the number and width of blocks imply that 
monthly water bills vary widely across countries (figure 7). For low levels of monthly consumption (3 
cubic meters), the difference between the lowest (Honduras) and highest (the Bahamas and Uruguay) 
bill is about $12. At the highest level of consumption (50 cubic meters), this difference grows to $230. 
Excluding the outlier in the sample (the Bahamas), significant differences in water bills start appearing 
at consumption levels of 15 cubic meters. The average bill for consumption of 15 cubic meters a 
month, considered to be the minimum amount of water required at the household level to satisfy basic 
needs, is $8.50 in LAC (see appendix figure A.1),
4
 slightly less than in other developing regions, such 
as Sub-Saharan Africa ($9.90) or the Middle East and North Africa ($10.40). LAC households less, on 
average, than these two developing regions’ households for the minimum level of consumption to 
cover for basic needs. But prices vary widely across countries. In most countries in LAC, the unit price 
is slightly higher for higher levels of consumption, pointing towards a tariff structure penalizing high 
levels of consumption.  
  
                                                     
4
 At 15 cubic meters of consumption, the lowest bill is in Honduras ($1.12) and the highest is in the Bahamas ($53.87). 
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Figure 7 Monthly water bill in selected capitals, 2016  
 
Sources: Data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET) and Global Water 
Intelligence (2016). 
Another indicator that reveals the heterogeneity in water prices in LAC is the average price per cubic 
meter (figure 8). In most LAC capitals, the average price per cubic meter increases as a function of the 
consumption level, albeit not steeply. Some countries charge the same rate per cubic meter, regardless 
of the level of consumption. No country in LAC charges less per cubic meter for higher levels of 
consumption.
5
  
  
                                                     
5
 In some countries outside the region, such as Spain, the average price of water falls as consumption rises. 
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Figure 8 Average price of water in selected capitals, 2016 
 
Sources: Data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET) and Global Water 
Intelligence (2016). 
Unreliable Access to Water  
Urban access to water increased markedly after 1990, but the share of the population with continuous 
access actually declined slightly between 2008 and 2012, according to survey of selected cities in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
falling from 87.9 percent to 86.5 percent (CAF, 2014). Moreover, among the share of the population 
that does not have a continuous access to water services (13.5 percent in 2012), there was a significant 
increase between 2008 and 2012 in the share of users who had access less than once every 15 days, 
from 38.0 percent to 44.4 percent (figure 9). On the positive side, among people who lacked 
continuous water service, there was an increase in the share of people with access a few hours every 
day (from 44.6 percent to 56.3 percent) and a significant decrease in the share of users with access 
only every two or three days (from 14.0 percent to 7.4 percent).  
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Figure 9 Urban access to water in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008 and 2012 
 
Source: CAF (2014). 
Note: Survey conducted by the Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina in cities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Health Consequences of Unsafe Water and Sanitation  
Limited and unreliable access has negative effects on public health. The mortality rate attributed to 
unsafe water and sanitation is much lower in LAC (3.15 per 100,000 people) than in other developing 
regions (table 1). It is significantly higher than in developed regions, such as Europe (0.65 per 100,000 
people) and North America (0.6 per 100,000 people), however. (See appendix figure A.2 for national 
mortality rates in LAC.)  
Table 1 Mortality rates attributed to unsafe water and sanitation, by developing region, 2012  
  Mortality rate  
(deaths per 100,000 people) Region 
Sub-Saharan Africa 39.5 
Middle East and North Africa 11.58 
South-East Asia 7.73 
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.15 
 
Source: World Health Organization (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017). 
Another measure of the burden imposed by inadequate water and sanitation services is disability 
adjusted life years (DALYs).
6
 In 2012 LAC countries collectively lost 980,000 DALYs. The highest 
absolute figures were in Haiti, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Colombia (figure 10). On a 
population-adjusted basis, the heaviest burdens were in Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras.  
                                                     
6
 One DALY can be thought of as representing one lost year of healthy life. The sum of DALYs across the population can 
be thought of as a measure of the gap between the current health status and an ideal health situation, in which the entire 
population survives to old age, free of disease and disability. 
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Figure 10 Disability adjusted life years (DALYs) lost as a result of inadequate access to water 
and sanitation, by country, 2012  
 
Source: World Health Organization (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017).  
Figure 11 Unaccounted water as percent of supplied water in capitals of selected countries, 2012 
 
Source: Asociación de entes reguladores de agua potable y saneamiento de las Américas (ADERASA) (cited in Lentini 
2015). 
The share of unaccounted water is also high in LAC. In 2012, 39 percent of total water supply was 
unaccounted for (it leaked or did not make it to its destination for some other reason) (figure 11). In 
Costa Rica, Panama, or Uruguay, the figure exceeded 50 percent.  
Untreated wastewater is pumped into rivers and oceans, with severe consequences for both the 
environment and health. Even in urban areas, on average only 54 percent of wastewater was collected 
between 2008 and 2012 (the figure ranged from 10 percent in the Dominican Republic to 96 percent in 
Chile) (figure 12). Worse yet, only 26 percent of urban wastewater was treated (the figure ranged from 
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2 percent in the Dominican Republic to 69 percent in Chile). Data are not available for rural areas, but 
the problems are much worse there.  
Figure 12 Share of wastewater collected and treated in capitals of selected countries 
 
Source: AQUASTAT database of the Food and Agriculture Organization (accessed on July 31, 2017).  
Note: Data are averages for 2008–12.  
Sector Financing and Governance  
 
Performance of the water and sanitation sector is closely related to its financing and governance. 
This section examines the evolution of public and private financing of the sector over the past 
decade, the financial performance of sector operators, and the characteristics of the sector’s 
governance on a country-by-country basis.  
Investment in Water and Sanitation 
LAC needs to spend 0.30 percent of GDP a year until 2030 to meet the water and sanitation needs in 
order to maintain actual access rates in urban areas and improve access rates in rural areas by closing 
on the coverage and quality gaps (Arroyo, Ballestero, and Mejía 2015). Average annual investment in 
the water and sanitation sector over this period range from 0.19 to 0.38 percent of GDP, with an 
average of 0.28 percent of GDP (figure 13). Almost all of this spending was public.  
Moreover, new infrastructure put in place to close on the coverage and quality gaps, directly imply 
additional maintenance and operating costs. Thus, the necessary spending in water and sanitation 
should be above 0.30 percent of GDP, and an effort is then needed to increase the sector’s financing, 
whether the source is public or private, with respect to recent years in LAC.  
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Figure 13 Average spending on water and sanitation in Latin America and the Caribbean as 
percent of GDP, 2008-2015 
 
Source: Infralatam (accessed on July 19, 2017) and World Bank PPI database (accessed on May 12, 2017).  
Note: Data are for 2008–15. 
Spending varied widely across countries (figure 14). It was lowest in Chile (0.086 percent of GDP) 
and highest in Peru (0.65 percent of GDP).  
The relationship between spending and access is not clear. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Panama spent considerably less than average and had below-average access rates for both water and 
sanitation and suboptimal service quality. But other countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and Paraguay, spent significantly less than the sample average and had high rates of access to 
both water and sanitation, and in yet others (including Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Peru), 
access to water and sanitation was considerably weak, but spending was well above average, which 
could indicate that the necessary steps are being taken to close on the coverage and quality gaps. 
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Figure 14 Average spending on water and sanitation as percent of GDP in selected countries 
 
Source: Infralatam (accessed on July 19, 2017) and World Bank PPI database (accessed on May 12, 2017). 
Note: Data are for 2008–15. 
The private sector has an important role to play in LAC, particularly given the constraints on 
government budgets. After declining considerably between 2000 and 2011, it increased in 2012–2015 
(figure 15), making LAC the leading region in the world for private participation in the sector (figure 
16). More than three-quarters of commitments were concentrated in a few countries, however 
(including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico). Efforts are thus needed in the region to increase 
private participation throughout the region, not only to reach the necessary investment levels in the 
sector, but also to release pressure on government spending. 
Figure 15 Investment in public-private partnerships in water and sanitation in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, 1990–2015  
 
Source: World Bank PPI database (accessed on May 12, 2017). 
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Figure 16 Investment in public-private partnership in water and sanitation, by region, 1990–
2015 
 
Source: World Bank PPI database (accessed on December 5, 2017). 
The nature of private sector involvement in the sector has change since 1990. During the 1990s, 42 
percent of projects were brownfield, 21 percent were greenfield, 21 percent were divestitures, and 16 
percent were management and lease contracts (figure 17) (See Box 1 for a description of these types of 
contracts). From the early 2000s until the beginning of the financial and economic crisis in 2008, 
brownfield projects accounted for 73 percent of all commitments. In 2009–16, 68 percent of projects 
were brownfield projects, 28 percent were greenfield, and 4 percent were management and lease 
contracts. The private sector thus appears to be increasingly attracted to contract types entailing new 
investments and increased power of decision. Divestitures and management and lease contracts seem 
to have lost their appeal, as they do not imply new investments and have a higher dependence to the 
public sector.  
Box 1: Summary of characterization of contract types (The World Bank PPI Database) 
1. Management and lease contracts: Take-over of the management of a public asset by a private 
firm for a fixed duration (the ownership and investment decisions remain with public sector). 
2. Greenfield projects: Construction and operation of a new facility by a private operator or a 
partnership between private and public actors for a duration specified in the project contract. 
3. Brownfield projects: Take-over of the operations, improvement, expansion and/or 
rehabilitation of an existing asset by a private firm or a public-private partnership. 
4. Divestitures: Full or partial transfer of ownership of a public asset to a private firm through a 
direct sale or a public offering. 
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Figure 17 Distribution of public-private partnership contracts in water and sanitation in Latin 
America and the Caribbean by type, 1990–2016 
 
Source: World Bank PPI database (accessed on July 31, 2017). 
Throughout the last decade, financing in the sector has not reached the necessary levels to fill in the 
coverage and quality gaps, and efforts should be made in that sense during the next 15 years; in that 
sense, not only the public sector should increase the spending in water and sanitation, but efforts 
should be made to increase attractiveness of the sector to private participation, as current spending 
does not totally cover necessary financing in terms of new infrastructure, but consequently neither in 
terms of new maintenance and operation costs. 
Financial Performance of Water Operators  
Insufficient financial resources prevent operators from expanding the network and increasing the 
coverage rate and quality of service, thus having negative consequences in terms of efficiency and 
equity. Excessive dependence on the government creates financing uncertainty and opens the door to 
political interference and clientelism (Ducci and García Merino 2013).  
Two financial measures—the operating cost coverage ratio and the leverage rate— reveal the 
financial performance of water operators. The operating cost coverage ratio is the ratio of operating 
revenue over operating costs (excluding depreciation). The leverage rate (total liabilities over net 
worth) is an indicator of indebtedness.  
Information on these indicators is scarce in LAC. The very limited data available suggest that very 
few countries have water utilities with adequate operating cost coverage ratios.  
An operating cost coverage ratio of 1.30 allows a private operator to cover depreciation costs, 
taxes, and net financial results. A ratio above 1.30 allows it to invest in new infrastructure to improve 
coverage, or better quality). A ratio below 1.30 implies the need to find external financing sources, 
generally government funding (Ducci and García Merino 2013). 
Operating cost coverage ratios vary widely across countries (figure 18).
7
 Chile, Colombia and 
Costa Rica have operating cost coverage ratios that are well above 1.30. Argentina and Panama do not 
                                                     
7
 There appears to be little variability within countries, although the sample is small (see table A.2).  
42 
73 
68 
21 
16 
28 
21 
3 
0 
16 
8 
4 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1990-99 2000-08 2009-16
P
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
al
l c
o
n
tr
ac
ts
 
Brownfield Greenfield Divestiture Management and lease contracts
Salvador Bertoméu-Sánchez and Tomás Serebrisky 
16 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
cover their operating costs with their operating revenues. On average, operating revenues cover 
operating costs, but the average ratio (1.17) is below the recommended level of 1.30.  
Ducci and García Merino (2013) recommend that leverage not exceed 100 percent of net worth. 
The sample average leverage rate is 57 percent (see figure 18). Some countries have much higher 
averages, however. Brazil and Chile exceed 100 percent, but these high ratios reflect the easier access 
to financial markets that these countries’ operators have. Other countries are well below the sample 
average, such as Costa Rica, Uruguay or Panama. These low leverage rates show a significant room 
for maneuver in terms of accessing financial markets, but to do so, they should complement this room 
with enough attractiveness to investors 
Figure 18 Financial performance of water operators in capitals of selected countries, 2012 
 
Source: Asociación de entes reguladores de agua potable y saneamiento de las Américas (ADERASA) (cited in Lentini 
2015). 
The financial performance of LAC capital cities’ water operators shows a significant variability 
between the region’s countries. On the one hand, some countries show operating cost coverage ratios 
considerably high, implying a higher financial capability that will allow them, not only to cover their 
operating and financial costs, but also to invest to improve the service quality and coverage. Other 
countries find themselves in the opposite situation, not being able to cover their operating costs. 
Likewise, these countries appear to have considerably low leverage rates, which could indicate that 
their dependence on government financing is rather high, as they are not appealing enough to financial 
markets. Indeed, if operating revenues do not manage to cover operating costs, consequently, returns 
on investment should be relatively low, thus unattractive to potential investors.  
Regulation of the Water and Sanitation Sector  
To improve the governance of the water and sanitation sector and enhance its attractiveness to the 
private sector, many countries in LAC decentralized the provision of water and sanitation services in 
the 1990s and created independent regulatory agencies.
8
 By the mid-2000s, however, service provision 
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 The term independence does not imply complete independence from the political power but rather that financial, 
administrative, and operating autonomy limits political interference. 
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was decentralized but regulation was carried out at the central level. This model created conflicts that 
endangered the well-functioning of the sector and limited the positive effects of reforms. It also made 
the sector unattractive to the private sector (Foster 2005).  
Today, about 75 percent of LAC countries have independent agencies regulating their water 
sectors, and about 70 percent have private participation in the water and sanitation sector (table 2). 
About a quarter of countries with independent regulatory agencies do not have private sector 
participation, and about 20 percent of countries with private participation do not have regulatory 
agencies.  
Very few LAC countries have subnational independent regulatory agencies which, without having 
analyzed the decentralization level of water management (see below) would imply that no solution has 
been brought to the central regulation versus decentralized water management conflict described by 
Foster in 2005. It is thus worth analyzing whether centralization or decentralization levels of the water 
and sanitation sector regulation and its management coincide, or as was the case more than a decade 
ago, diverge, creating conflicts and affecting negatively the well-functioning of the sector. 
Table 2 Presence of independent regulatory agency and private participation in water and 
sanitation sector, 2017 
Item 
Independent 
regulatory 
agency 
Public-
private 
partnership 
(PPP) 
Independent 
regulatory 
agency and 
PPP 
PPP but no 
independent 
regulatory 
agency 
Independent 
regulatory 
agency but 
no PPP 
No PPP and 
no 
independent 
regulatory 
agency 
Subnational 
independent 
regulatory 
agency 
Multisector 
independent 
regulatory 
agency 
All 
countries 
 
Number 19 18 13 5 6 2 3 7 
Share 
(percent) 
73 69 50 19 23 8 12 27 
Sample 
size 
26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Developing 
 countries
 
Number 17 17 13 4 4 2 3 5 
Share 
(percent) 
74 74 57 17 17 9 13 22 
Sample 
size 
23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Developed 
 countries
 
Number 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 
Share 
(percent) 
67 33 0 33 67 0 0 67 
Sample 
Size 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Sources: Bertoméu-Sánchez, Camós, and Estache (2017) and data collected by the authors. 
Of the 19 countries in LAC that have independent regulatory agencies in the water sector, 10 have the 
same level of centralization in the regulation and management of the sector (table 3). These countries 
have kept the decision making of both areas at the central level. In the other nine countries, regulation 
of the sector is carried out at a less decentralized level (typically the central level) and management of 
the sector at a highly-decentralized level (typically the local level).  
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Table 3 Level of government handling regulation and management of the water sector in 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with independent regulatory agencies, 2017 
Country Regulation Management  
Argentina Regional Local 
Barbados Central Central 
Belize Central Central 
Bolivia Central Local 
Brazil State Local 
Chile Central Regional 
Colombia Central Local 
Costa Rica Central Central 
Dominican 
Republic 
Central Central 
Ecuador Canton Local 
El Salvador Central Central 
Honduras Central Local 
Jamaica Central Central 
Mexico Central Local 
Nicaragua Central Central 
Panama Central Central 
Paraguay Central Central 
Peru Central Local 
Uruguay Central Central 
 
   Sources: Herrera and Post (2014) and data collected by authors. 
Incongruences thus remain between the level of decentralization of sector regulation and management. 
They could be one factor behind the limited quality of service, the poor financial performance of water 
utilities, and the very low coverage rates in rural areas. 
Brief Review of the Empirical Literature  
Recent studies of LAC have confirmed the positive effects of higher-quality infrastructure on the 
economy and living standards documented in Aschauer’s seminal 1989 paper. Lanau (2017), for 
instance, shows that better infrastructure raises growth and investment and that improved 
infrastructure could yield substantial economic benefits in the region.  
Empirical studies focus on four areas: 
 performance indicators  
 the effects of privatization on sector performance 
 governance and policy aspects of the sector 
 tariff schemes and their linkages to performance indicators and governance characteristics.  
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Performance Indicators  
Performance of the water and sanitation sector is traditionally studied through its effects on the 
economy, public health and the environment. In their 2017 report, Fay et al. describe that water access 
has improved significantly over the last years but that sanitation coverage is an increasingly urgent 
challenge; likewise, inefficient public spending is one of the causes behind the challenges in the 
sector. Gamper-Rabindran, Khan, and Timmins (2010) find strong positive correlations between the 
introduction of piped water and reductions in the infant mortality rate in Brazil. Schady (2015) reviews 
the literature and finds that the stronger evidence on the relationship between access to water and 
sanitation infrastructure and child outcomes in LAC is for extensions of coverage and is limited to 
child mortality; it does not cover other health aspects, such as morbidity, nutritional status, or 
development. Grafton et al. (2011) analyze a 10-country household survey. They find that concerns 
about the environment have a significant effect on some self-reported water-saving behaviors. 
Molinos-Senante and Donoso (2016) propose a water rate for Chile that creates incentives to improve 
water use sustainability. 
Effects of Privatization  
In their study of Brazil, Barbosa, De Lima, and Brusca (2016) argue that privatization is a consistent 
manner of ensuring accessibility to water services, as the private sector provides with the financing 
that the public sector does not have the capacity to cover. Clarke, Kosec, and Wallsten (2009) find that 
following the introduction of private sector participation in Latin America, the share of households 
connected to piped water and sewerage rose significantly and the introduction of the private sector did 
not have any negative effects on the poor. Galliani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) show that child 
mortality in Argentina fell by about 8 percent in areas that introduced the private sector in their water 
services; the reduction was largest in the poorest areas. In their study of all infrastructure sectors in in 
nine Latin American countries, Sirtaine et al. (2005) find that the financial returns of private 
investment were modest and that returns to many concessions were below the cost of capital. Andrés, 
Schwartz, and Guasch (2013) find that the performance of water utilities in LAC is not highly 
correlated with the type of ownership (public or private).  
Effects of Governance 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) show that, for developing countries and infrastructure in general, the 
effect of switching from centralization to decentralization depends on the financing mechanism of 
local governments. Herrera and Post (2014) find that decentralization does not necessarily stop 
political interference in the water and sanitation sector. Barde (2017) concludes that access rates in 
Brazil increased considerably between 2000 and 2010 in areas in which local governments were 
responsible for service. Barbosa, De Lima, and Brusca (2016) show that utilities operate best at the 
metropolitan level.  
Bertoméu-Sánchez, Camós, and Estache (2017) find that globally, though having an independent 
regulatory agency has positive effects on the functioning of the sector, such an agency is not a 
necessary or sufficient condition for attracting private sector participation, although in LAC having an 
independent regulatory agency increases the odds of attracting private financing to the sector. Estache, 
Gómez-Lobo and Leipziger (2001) for Latin America, and Andrés, Schwartz, and Guasch (2013) 
conclude that although private participation has been crucial in increasing sector performance, it must 
be accompanied by transparent and accountable regulation, which significantly improves performance, 
and makes the poor better off as a result. Ferro, Romero, and Covelli (2011) highlight that regulation 
can have positive effects on efficiency as long as information is available, quality standards are well 
specified, and other conditions are met. 
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Tariffs  
Zetland and Gasson (2013) show that globally, higher water tariffs are correlated with lower per capita 
consumption, lower water availability, higher demand, and lower risk of shortage; at the national level, 
higher tariffs are also correlated with higher GDP and better governance. Jiménez, Serebrisky, and 
Mercado (2016) show that in Santo Domingo, in the Dominican Republic, regardless of the price they 
pay, consumers’ satisfaction and willingness to pay is positively related to the quality of water service. 
Ferro and Lentini (2013) find that financial sustainability is strongly correlated with access to 
improved water rates. 
Nauges and Whittington (2017) and Whittington et al. (2015) show that increasing block tariffs 
perform poorly in targeting subsidies to the poor. These tariff schemes also introduce price distortions 
that create economic efficiency losses, though welfare losses are relatively low. Barde and Lehman 
(2014) show that means-tested tariffs distribute more income to the poor than increasing block tariffs 
but that the share of poor consumers benefiting from water subsidies is lower than it is with means-
tested tariffs. Molinos and Donoso (2016) propose a water rate that incentivizes water use 
sustainability and equity among consumers. 
Concluding Remarks 
Several important findings emerge from this study: 
 Thanks to the reforms undertaken in the 1990s, access to improved water is now almost 
universal in LAC (95 percent). Efforts are still needed in the sanitation sector and in rural areas 
in both sectors.  
 Increasing block tariffs, which part of the literature has strongly criticized and is the main type of 
tariff used in the region, do not penalize high consumption levels sufficiently. The average bill 
for 15 cubic meters of water (the minimum needed to cover basic needs) is lower in LAC than in 
the Middle East and North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Service quality remains weak. The continuity of service has declined in recent years, and in 
urban areas (for which data are available) almost 40 percent of supplied water is wasted (the 
situation is worse in rural areas, although data are not available). Poor service quality affects the 
economy, and both human health and the environment. 
 The financial health and sustainability of water utilities is weak. Access to capital markets is 
difficult for most utilities in the region.  
 Most countries have independent regulatory agencies in the sector. The literature suggests that 
they improve the provision of water and sanitation services but do not necessarily increase 
private sector participation, which remains a challenge.  
 The divergence between the level of decentralization of regulation and management persists in 
almost half the countries in the region, limiting the scope for improving sector performance.  
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Appendix  
Table A.1 Regulators of the water and sanitation sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, by 
country  
Country Organization 
Member 
of 
ADERASA9 
Separate 
regulatory body 
Year of 
establishment 
Level of 
regulation 
Argentina 
Asoaciación de Entes 
Reguladores de Agua y 
Saneamiento de la 
República Argentina 
Yes Yes 1991 Province 
Bahamas, 
The 
Water and Sewerage 
Corporation 
No No 1976 National 
Barbados Fair Trading Commission No Yes 2001 (1955) National 
Belize 
Public Utilities 
Commission 
Yes Yes 1999 National 
Bolivia 
Autoridad de Fiscalización 
y Control Social de Agua y 
Saneamiento Básico 
Yes Yes 2000 National 
Brazil 
Associação Brasileira de 
Agências de Regulação 
Yes Yes 1999 State 
Chile 
Superintendencia de 
Servicios Sanitarios 
Yes Yes 1990 National 
Colombia 
Comisión de Regulación 
de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento Básico 
Yes Yes 1994 National 
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Superintendencia de 
Servicios Públicos 
Domiciliarios 
No Yes 1991 National 
Costa Rica 
Autoridad Reguladora de 
los Servicios Públicos de 
Costa Rica 
Yes Yes 1999 National 
Dominican 
Republic 
Instituto Nacional de 
Aguas Potables y 
Alcantarillados 
Yes Yes 1962 
National 
(25 of 31 
provinces) 
Ecuador 
Empresa Municipal de 
Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado de 
Guayaquil 
Yes Yes 2001 Canton 
Agencia de Regulación y 
Control de Agua 
No Yes 2014 National 
El Salvador 
Administración Nacional 
de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados 
Yes Yes 1961 National 
Guatemala 
Ministry of Public Health 
and Social Assistance 
No No 1944 National 
Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural 
Resources 
No No 2000 National 
Guyana, CR 
Public Utilities 
Commission 
No No 1990 National 
Haiti 
National Directorate for 
Water Supply and 
Sanitation (Ministry of 
Public Works) 
No No - National 
Honduras 
Ente Regulador de 
Servicios de Agua Potable 
y Saneamiento 
Yes Yes 2003 National 
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Jamaica 
The Office of Utilities 
Regulation 
No Yes 1995 National 
Mexico 
Asociación Nacional de 
Empresas de Agua y 
Saneamiento de México 
Yes No 1992 National 
Nicaragua 
Instituto Nicaragüense de 
Acueductos y 
Alcantarillado Sanitario 
Yes Yes 1979 National 
Panama 
Autoridad Nacional de los 
Servicios Públicos 
Yes Yes 1996 National 
Paraguay 
Ente Regulador de 
Servicios Sanitarios 
Yes Yes 2000 National 
Peru 
Superintendencia 
Nacional de Servicios de 
Saneamiento 
Yes Yes 1992 National 
Suriname 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources 
No No 1991 National 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Regulated Industries 
Commission 
No Yes 1998 National 
Uruguay 
Unidad Reguladora de 
Servicios Energía y Agua 
Yes Yes 2002 National 
Venezuela 
Ministry of Popular Power 
for Ecosocialism and 
Water 
No No 2015 National 
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Figure A.1 Cost of water in selected capitals, 2016 
 
Sources: Data from the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET) and Global Water 
Intelligence (2016). 
Figure A.2 Mortality rates attributed to unsafe water and sanitation, by country 2012 
 
Source: World Health Organization (2016) (accessed on July 4, 2017).  
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Table A.2 Operating cost coverage ratios in selected countries  
 
Country Average Standard deviation 
Argentina 0.86 0.36 
Brazil 1.43 0.17 
Chile 1.54 0.22 
Colombia 1.24 0.17 
Ecuador 1.27 0.30 
Peru 0.86 0.18 
 
Source: Asociación de entes reguladores de agua potable y saneamiento de las Américas (ADERASA) (cited in Lentini 
2015). 
Note: Table includes countries for which data are available on more than one operator. 
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